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Abstract— Smart Grid is an integrated power grid with a.
reliable,  communication network running in parallel  towards
providing two way communications in the grid. It’s trivial to
mention that a network like this would connect a huge number
of IP-enabled devices. IPv6 that offers 18-bit address space be-
comes an obvious choice in this context. In a smart grid, func-
tionalities like neighborhood discovery, autonomic address con-
figuration of a node or its router identification may often be in-
voked whenever newer equipments are introduced for capacity
enhancement at some level  of  hierarchy. In IPv6, these basic
functionalities like neighborhood discovery, autonomic address
configuration  of  networking  require  to  use  Internet  Control
Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6). Such usage may lead to
security breaches in the grid as a result of possible abuses of
ICMPv6 protocol. In this paper, some potential newer attacks
on Smart  Grid  have  been discussed.  Subsequently,  intrusion
prevention mechanisms for these attacks are proposed to plug-
in the threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
 SMART grid is an intelligent energy network that inte-
grates  the  actions  of  all  users  connected  to  it  and
makes use of advanced information, control, and communi-
cation technologies to save energy, reduce cost and increase
reliability and transparency [1]. 
A
The backbone of the Smart Grid will be its communica-
tion network. This network is to connect the different com-
ponents  of  the Smart  Grid together,  and provide  two-way
communication. IPv6 is a new technology which gained a
massive attention, as a supporting layer in smart grid com-
munication.  The huge  address  space  of  IPv6 supports  the
network architecture of the smart grid communications. Be-
sides,  features  like  stateless  address  auto  configuration
(SLAAC) and IPSec support makes IPv6 more suitable for
smart grid. IPv6 also supports prioritization of messages and
different  Quality  of  Service  models,  which  complements
several smart grid applications [8]. However, with these new
advancements in technology, IPv6 is also exposed to various
attacks,  such  as  header  modification  attack,  fragmentation
attacks , etc. [5], [6]. In this paper, we focus on some of the
possible ICMPv6 attacks that are particularly relevant in the
context of building networking infrastructure between Smart
Meters (SM), Data Collection Units (DCU) and Meter Data
Management System (MDMS). We would demonstrate how
these could affect the Smart Grid before proposing appropri-
ate Intrusion Prevention  Systems (IPS)  to protect  the grid
from such attacks.
IPv4 networks often filter ICMP messages to avoid secu-
rity  concerns.  However,  for  IPv6,  this  is  not  possible.
ICMPv6 is used for basic functionalities and used by other
IPv6  protocols  like  Neighbor  Detection  Protocol  (NDP).
Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is a protocol used with
IPv6 to perform various tasks like router discovery, auto ad-
dress configuration of a node, neighbor discovery, Duplicate
Address Detection, determining the Link Layer addresses of
other nodes, address prefix discovery, and maintaining rout-
ing  information  about  the  paths  to  other  active  neighbor
nodes [4]. Thus, the implementation of IPv6 in Smart Grid
needs some serious care to protect from the security vulnera-
bilities  of  the  ICMPv6  protocol.  NDP uses  five  ICMPv6
messages. These are:
• Router  Solicitation (RS) message:  Hosts send RS
message to enquire about a legitimate router on the
link. 
• Router Advertisement (RA) message: Routers send
RA message, either periodically or in response to
RS message.
• Neighbor  Solicitation  (NS)  message:  Hosts  send
NS message to determine the link layer address of a
specific node, and also to verify whether an address
is already present on link or not.
• Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message: Hosts send
NA message in response to the NS message.
• Router  Redirect  (RR)  message:  Routers  send  RR
message to inform a host about a better router on its
link.
With  higher  degree  of  autonomic  control  and  decision
making, a smart grid also becomes subject to several secu-
rity concerns. Smart grid is generally considered as a hetero-
geneous, backward compatible, static, self adapting and self
healing network, with a large number of devices, where two
way communications is provided between Smart Meters and
a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tem. This requires special QoSs, like high restriction on de-
lay, failure and voltage quality [3]. In smart
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grid, availability and integrity are typically considered more 
important than confidentiality [9]. Also the risk factor is 
quite high in smart grid as compared to traditional networks. 
Thus, the existing solutions for cyber security often fall short 
of the typical requirements for a smart grid.  
Some work has been done to secure smart meters and 
communication network of Smart Grid or SCADA systems 
[10]. An IPv6 based moving target defense system is 
provided in [11] to secure the communication between hosts. 
Most of the network attacks target some specific addresses, 
so, moving the target address will prevent hosts from being 
located for an attack. [12], [13], [14] explains different 
techniques for IPv6 address configuration schemes for smart 
grid. However, security solutions for specific IPv6 problems, 
like ICMPv6 attacks, for Smart Grid environment are still 
need to be addressed. In [16], a distributive, trust based 
approach to detect attacks in Duplicate Address Detection 
(DAD) phase was proposed. However, this concentrates only 
on one type of attack in DAD. In [17], the requirements and 
practical needs for monitoring and intrusion detection in 
AMI is discussed. In [18], a layered combined signature and 
anomaly-based IDS for HAN was proposed. This IDS was 
designed for a ZigBee based HAN which works at the 
physical and medium access control (MAC) layers. 
However, the work only considers the HAN part of AMI. In 
[19], a specification-based IDS for AMI is proposed. While 
the solution in [19] relies on protocol specifications, security 
requirements and security policies to detect security 
violations, it would be expensive to deploy such IDS since it 
uses a separate sensor network to monitor the AMI. 
We have proposed a new Intrusion Prevention System for 
providing security against ICMPv6 attacks in smart grid 
networks. The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we 
discuss three important functionalities for a Smart Meter: 
Router Discovery, Duplicate Address Detection and 
Neighbor Discovery, using NDP and various ICMPv6 
messages. Possible attacks and the effects of those attacks on 
smart grid are analyzed for each function. Finally, we 
propose an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to prevent the 
attacks in the Router Discovery phase and detect the attacks 
in the Duplicate Address Detection and Neighbor Discovery 
phase.  
Notice that we do not claim that using NDP or ICMPv6 is 
the only option for realizing functionalities like router 
discovery or address configuration in a smart grid. As for 
example, instead of having an auto configurable addressing 
scheme, smart grids may also have independent Certifying 
Authority (CA) for providing addresses to newly installed 
SMs. However, the cost of installation and maintenance of 
such centrally controlled architecture may be avoided using 
auto configurable SMs. This paper aims to expose the 
security threats there and to propose suitable intrusion 
prevention mechanisms to safeguard smart grids from 
ICMPv6 misuses.  
II. SMART GRID AND ICMPV6 ABUSES 
Figure 1 shows the communication architecture of Smart 
Grid. Smart Energy Utility Network (SUN) hierarchically 
consists of three components: Home Area Network (HAN), 
Neighborhood Area Network (NAN), and Wide Area 
Network (WAN) [15]. The HAN provides the 
communication between the Smart Meters in a home and 
other appliances in that home. The NAN connects SMs to 
the Data Collection Units (DCUs), and WAN provides 
access between the DCUs and Meter Data Management 
System (MDMS). DCU collects data from hundreds of SMs 
and sends them to the MDMS. At the lowest level, the smart 
meters act as hosts in a network and DCUs are the routers of 
the network. We assume that  • Smart Meters are managed by DCUs. When a SM X is 
installed in a subnet, it should find a DCU, say R, to bind 
with. X will continue to communicate through DCU R, 
Fig. 1: Communication Architecture of Smart Grid 
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until it receives any ICMPv6 Router Redirect (RR) 
message from R. •  Each DCU keeps a neighbor cache, storing the addresses 
of all DCUs in its neighborhood.  • Each subnet has a different and unique 64 bit prefix 
address for addressing SMs within the subnet. • Each DCU communicates with the SMs within its 
subnet, and then transmits the aggregated data to DCU. • Every SM keeps a neighbor cache to store addresses of 
all its one hop neighbors 
A.  Router Discovery 
When a SM X is installed in a subnet, it should find a 
DCU to bind with. The Smart Meter X will continue to 
communicate through that DCU, until it receives any 
ICMPv6 Router Redirect (RR) message from the previous 
DCU.  
 Normal Procedure for Router Discovery 
Normally Smart Meters discover their router or DCU 
through the following steps, • First, X sends an ICMPv6 Router Solicitation (RS) 
message to locate a DCU in its local link.  • A legitimate DCU then responds with an ICMPv6 Router 
Advertisement (RA) message, with a 64 bit prefix 
address for its subnet.  • Then X registers that DCU as its default router in the 
link, and auto-configures a global unicast address based 
on the received prefix. 
Attacks in Router Discovery phase 
The most prominent attack in this phase occurs if an 
attacker falsely claims to be a DCU. It can spoof an RA 
message from a legitimate DCU and send it to the Smart 
Meter, with or without altering the prefix address for that 
subnet.  In either case, the newly installed Smart Meter 
registers the attacker as its DCU. If the adversary alters the 
prefix address, then the Smart Meter will auto-configure its 
global address based on a wrong prefix. As a result, the 
Smart Meter will get blocked in the subnet and will not be 
able to communicate with any other Smart Meter or DCU 
except the attacker. The situation becomes a bit more 
complex when the adversary sends the RA message without 
changing the prefix. In this situation, the Smart Meter can 
communicate within its subnet. However, it becomes quite 
impossible for the Smart Meter to communicate beyond its 
subnet as the registered DCU for the Smart Meter is an 
attacker who is not recognized by other Smart Meters in the 
Neighborhood Area Network. 
Once an adversary successfully convinces a newly 
installed Smart Meter of being its valid DCU, it can launch a 
myriad of conventional network attacks on the Smart Grid. It 
can launch a man-in-the-middle attack by intercepting 
packets from the Smart Meters or from the DCUs and 
suitable changing the Source and Destination address fields 
such that neither of these two entities are aware of the 
presence of an attacker in between. The attacker can also 
tweak the data contained in the intercepted packets. Another 
traditional network attack is the Denial-of-Service attack. 
The attacker can overload the network resources by 
generating spurious packets having the newly installed 
Smart Meter address as the Source Address. 
B. Duplicate Address Detection 
After auto configuring the address for itself, the Smart 
Meter X will want to know whether the address is available 
for use.  
Normal Procedure for Duplicate Address Detection 
 The following steps are used for duplicated address 
detection. • Smart Meter X, sends an ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation 
message for the address it wants to claim.  • If any Smart Meter on that subnet already has that 
address, then it sends an ICMPv6 Neighbor 
Advertisement message.  • If X does not receive any NA messages stating that the 
address has been taken, then X is able to use that address.  
Attacks in Duplicate Address Detection phase 
 An intruder can prevent a Smart Meter from acquiring 
any auto-configured address, by sending an NA for the 
corresponding address in every NS message sent out by the 
Smart Meter. As a result, the Smart Meter will not be able to 
communicate within the network. Besides, an intruder can 
block a NA message from an authentic SM. This results in 
two or more SMs using the same address within a network. 
As a result of this attack, a legitimate SM can be accused of 
identity spoofing. Also, more than one assignment of the 
same address within a network can cause improper 
functioning during the routing phase. 
In order to detect these kinds of attacks, we propose a 
modified version of the Duplicate Address Detection phase, • SM X sends an ICMPv6 NS message for the address it 
wants to acquire.  • On receiving the NS message, every Smart Meter scans 
its neighbor cache information for that address. If they 
find the address in their cache, then they send a reply to 
the X. • If any Smart Meter on that subnet already has that 
address, then it sends an ICMPv6 NA message.  • If the X receives neither any NA messages stating that 
the address has been taken nor receives any messages 
from its neighbors stating that the address is present in 
their cache, then X is able to use that address.  
If X receives only the NA message from another Smart 
Meter but no neighborhood information about that address is 
received, it implies that such an address is not in existence 
within the subnet and some attacker is trying to prevent X 
from acquiring that address. If X does not receive any NA 
message, but its neighbors reply with their cache information 
stating that the address is present in their neighborhood, then 
the X concludes that an attacker has intercepted the NA 
message from the target Smart Meter and has dropped it. 
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Thus, X is able to use an address only when it neither 
receives the NA nor any neighborhood cache information 
from its neighbors. 
If the attacker is intelligent enough, it can send both the 
NA message and also spoof some reply messages from other 
Smart Meters and change their contents. In that case, SM X 
will not be able to detect the attack. So, to detect this kind of 
attack, if a Smart Meter exists with the same address, it not 
only replies with an NA message but also sends its 
neighborhood information to X. SM X then sends unicast 
queries to each of the neighbors found in the reply message 
to verify the existence of such a Smart Meter. In this way, X 
can be assured whether he is being duped or whether the 
particular address is really being used within the subnet. 
However, since the reply message can also be intercepted by 
the attacker, it must be broadcast within the network. This 
will assure the delivery of the reply message to X. 
C. Neighbor Discovery 
Once the Smart Meter acquires a unique global address, 
then it can start communication through the DCU. It can also 
communicate with the other Smart Meters, both in its subnet 
and in other subnets. Smart Meters on the same subnet can 
communicate directly with each other without using any 
router or gateway when a SM has link layer addresses of 
other neighboring SMs. Thus it is important to store the link 
layer addresses of the neighboring SMs in the local cache of 
every SM. Neighbor Discovery facilitates the same.  
Normal Procedure for Neighbor Discovery 
In order to communicate with a SM B on its own subnet, a 
Smart Meter A has to perform the following steps,  • First, the SM A sends an ICMPv6 NS message 
requesting the link-layer address of B.  • If B is present in that subnet, then it replies with an 
ICMPv6 NA message. SM A knows the MAC address of 
B from this NA message.  • SM A then creates a neighbor cache entry for B that 
binds the MAC address of B to its IPv6 address. 
Attacks in Neighbor Discovery phase 
 The attacks of this phase are similar to the attacks of the 
Duplicate Address Detection phase. Here also an intruder 
can try to impersonate B, and intercept all packets that are 
destined to B, or an intruder can block a NA reply from B so 
that A thinks that B is not present in the network. 
III. PROPOSED IPS TO HANDLE ICMPV6 THREATS IN SMART 
GRID 
In section 2, we have seen three possible security breaches 
in Smart Grid for Router Discovery, Duplicate Address 
Detection and for Neighbor Discovery in sub-sections II.A, 
II.B and in II.C respectively. The Intrusion Prevention 
Systems (IPS) against each of these three attacks due to 
ICMPv6 vulnerabilities have been proposed in the following 
sub-sections. 
A.  Intrusion Prevention Mechanism in Router Discovery 
and Updation phase   
In order to prevent these possible security threats, we 
propose a modified Router Discovery phase as follows,  • First, SM X sends an ICMPv6 RS message to locate a 
DCU in its local link.  • X receives an ICMPv6 RA message with a 64 bit prefix 
address for its subnet.  • On receiving the RA message, X extracts the DCU’s 
address from the packet. • X then broadcasts an ICMPv6 Echo Request message on 
its subnet.  • Receivers of the ICMPv6 Echo Request message will 
communicate with their DCU. If a new valid DCU is 
installed in the subnet, then the other DCUs will have 
information about the new DCU. If receivers of ICMPv6 
Echo Request message receive Router Redirect message 
(RR) from their current DCU, then they reply with an 
ICMPv6 Echo Reply message with the address of the 
new DCU.  • Otherwise, Echo Reply message contains the address of 
the existing DCUs. • If the DCU address in the RA message received by SM 
X matches with a majority of the neighbors’ default 
routers address, then SM X concludes that the DCU is 
authentic. Consequently, X installs this DCU as its 
default router in the link, and auto-configures a global 
unicast address based on the received subnet prefix. • If the received DCU’s address does not match with the 
address of the default router of the majority of the 
neighbors, say C, then X concludes that it has been 
attacked by some adversary and C is the original DCU of 
that subnet.  • Subsequently, X installs C as its default router in the 
subnet and auto-configures a global unicast address 
based on the prefix of C. • If X does not receive any Echo Reply message within a 
certain time, then it concludes that it has been blocked by 
some attacker and sends an SMS alert to the registered 
mobile number. 
Router Updation Phase 
DCUs in the Smart Grid network periodically broadcast 
RA messages to advertise themselves on the subnet. If a 
Smart Meter receives a RA from a DCU, then they change 
their existing DCU and register the new DCU as a router in 
its routing information table. 
In this situation an attacker may spoof a RA message and 
send it to some Smart Meters. On receiving a RA message, 
Smart Meters then register the attacker as a router. In order 
to detect this kind of attacks we propose an intrusion 
prevention mechanism as follows, • DCUs periodically broadcast RA message. •  On receiving a RA message with new DCU information, 
every Smart Meter sends a RS message to its existing 
DCU. 
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• The existing DCU, on receiving a RS message, checks 
whether a new DCU with higher priority is available for 
the subnet. • If such a DCU exists, it sends a RR message to the SMs 
with the information of the new DCU. Otherwise, it 
advertises itself again with a RA message. • A SM resets its DCU information if and only if it 
receives a RR message and the DCU information 
contained within the RR message matches with the 
previously received RA message. Otherwise, it discards 
the RA message. 
Figure 2 shows a high level view of intrusion detection in 
Router Discovery and Updation phase, when an attacker 
spoofs a RA message from DCU and sends it to a Smart 
Meter X without changing the 64 bit prefix address. In the 
first half of the figure, an attacker spoofs a RA message and 
sends it to the newly installed Smart Meter X. In the second 
half of the figure, an attacker broadcasts a RA message to all 
the working Smart Meters. 
The proposed IPS apparently comes with a boot-strapping 
limitation. It will not work properly when a new Smart 
Meter is installed under a new subnet. If Smart Meter X is 
the first meter in the subnet, then it can’t consult with its 
neighbors to authenticate a legitimate DCU. However, in 
practice when a new DCU, say K, is to be introduced in a 
layer just on top of the SMs, some of the SMs under a 
neighboring DCU will be allocated under K by using RR 
messages from the current DCU of the respective SMs. The 
Fig. 2: High level view of Intrusion Prevention in Router Discovery and Updation phase 
DCU R Smart Meter X Attacker T 
Broadcast ICMPv6 RS message to locate a 
Legitimate DCU in the link 
Send RA with a valid prefix 
Send RA with a 
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Smart Meter 
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Smart Meter 
Y 
Extract DCU’s 
Address=T 
Broadcast ICMPv6 Echo Request 
message 
Send ICMPv6 Echo reply message with 
their DCU’s address = R 
Check, X’s DCU’s Address 
with the majority of X’s 
Neighbor’s DCU’s address 
Addresses did 
not match 
 
Register majority of X’s Neighbor’s DCU’s 
address, i.e., DCU R as a valid DCU in the link 
Discard DCU R’s 
RA message 
Send RA with a valid prefix 
Send RS message  
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Check whether 
new DCU is 
available 
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message 
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same is applicable for the entire Smart Grid when a new 
DCU is to be introduced at any higher level. Thus, the boot-
strapping problem as mentioned above will not be an actual 
bottleneck in the context of smart grid.  
B. Intrusion Prevention Mechanism in Duplicate Address 
Detection 
In order to secure Duplicate Address Detection, the 
following steps are performed, • SM X sends an ICMPv6 NS message for the address it 
wants to acquire, say Z.  
• If Z already exists in the same subnet, then it broadcasts 
an ICMPv6 NA message along with the address of all 
neighbors in its neighbor cache.  • If Z exists, then its one-hop neighbors have Z in their 
neighborhood cache. These neighbors, on receiving the 
NS message, reply with a confirmation message. • X builds the neighbor list of Z from the unicast 
confirmation messages received from Z’s neighbors and 
verifies it with the neighborhood data sent by the node Z 
itself. 
• If majority of the neighbors confirm the existence of Z, 
then X concludes that it cannot use Z. Otherwise, X 
sends unicast queries to those neighbors of Z from which 
it did not receive any confirmation message.  • Each neighbor N broadcasts Hello message to update its 
Neighbors. If N finds Z as a neighbor, then it sends a 
reply confirming existence of Z or remains silent. • SM X continues sending these queries until either it has a 
majority decision or all neighbors of Z have been 
exhaustively queried. 
• If X receives both NA message from Z and majority 
confirmation messages from Z’s one-hop neighbors, then 
it repeats the process with some other auto configured 
address P. Otherwise, X can use the address Z. 
Figure 3 shows a high level view of intrusion detection in 
Duplicate Address Detection phase, when X wants to 
acquire address B. However, in this case, B is already 
present in the subnet. X verifies the presence of another SM 
in the subnet, with same address, i.e. B, with the help of B’s 
neighbor list: C, A. Consequently, A wants to acquire 
Fig. 3: High level view of Intrusion Prevention in Duplicate Address Detection phase 
Create a neighbor 
cache entry for B 
Smart Meter 
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Attacker Smart Meter 
C 
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address D. This time an attacker falsely claims himself to be 
D. X successfully detects this attack.  
C. Intrusion Prevention in Neighbor Discovery phase 
The detection procedure is quite similar to the Duplicate 
Address Detection phase as discussed to section III.B. At 
first, SM X sends an ICMPv6 NS message requesting the 
link-layer address of Z. On receiving the NS message, every 
Smart Meter scans its neighbor cache information for that 
address. If they find the address of Z in their cache, then 
they send the address of all neighbors of its neighbor cache 
to X. If node Z is present in that subnet, then it replies with 
an ICMPv6 NA message and sends the addresses of all 
neighbors of its neighbor cache. From that NA message, SM 
X knows the MAC address of Z.   
Subsequently, SM X sends unicast queries to each of the 
neighbors found in the reply message to verify the existence 
of Z. Every neighbor will broadcast their replies. If X 
receives a NA messages from Z and majority of reply 
messages from the neighbors assuring the existence of Z, 
then SM X creates a neighbor cache entry for Z that binds 
the MAC address of Z to its IPv6 address. Figure 4 shows a 
high level view of intrusion detection that may occur during 
the Neighbor Discovery phase. Here, DCU X wants to 
communicate with SM Z, but attacker node tries to 
impersonate Z. 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In order to access the performance of ICMPv6 in absence 
of the proposed IPS and in its presence, we have simulated 
an environment using Qualnet simulator software. In order 
to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, two 
of the most important performance metrics have been 
considered. These are false negatives and jitter. False 
negative is measured with respect to both node density and 
fake router density. Jitter is compared for ICMPv6, with and 
without our proposed algorithm. The simulation scenario 
and settings are described in Table I below.  
Fig. 4: High level view of Intrusion Detection in Neighbor Discovery phase 
Z is not available 
for use 
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TABLE I. 
 SIMULATOR PARAMETER SETTINGS 
Parameter Value 
Terrain area 1500X1500 m2 
Simulation time 100 sec 
Mac Layer protocol DCF of IEEE 802.11b standard 
Traffic Model CBR (Constant Bit Rate) 
No. of CBR applications 10 % of the number of nodes 
Routing Protocol AODV 
DCU: Smart Meter 1:5 
A. False Negative 
False Negative occurs when a system cannot detect an 
attack. False negatives are often a greater threat than false 
positives. If there wasn’t an attack and the system makes a 
false detection, it can affect the throughput at most. 
However, if there was an attack and the system is not able to 
detect it, then it may be disastrous. However, in our 
proposed IPS, there are no false positives for relatively 
smaller number of intruders. However, the IPS suffers from 
false negatives with increasing percentage of malicious 
nodes. Figure 5 shows that there are no false negative for 2, 
4, or 6 malicious nodes out of 50 nodes. The fake router 
percentage represents the increasing number of fake routers 
or malicious nodes in a fixed number of nodes. For this 
experiment we take, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 fake routers in 50 
nodes, with 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24 percentages respectively. The 
false negative increases with increasing number of malicious 
nodes. Figure 6 shows the effect on false negatives with a 
linear percentage of malicious nodes, i.e. a fixed percentage 
of fake routers or malicious nodes in an increasing number 
of total nodes. We carry out this experiment with 10, 20, 30, 
40 and 50 nodes and 20% malicious nodes for each data set. 
There were no false negatives for 10, 20, 30 and 50 nodes 
with 20% malicious nodes. The experimental results are in 
line with reality where any IPS system fails when majority 
of nodes become compromised. 
B. Jitter 
Jitter is expressed as an average of the deviation from the 
network mean latency. We measure both the Jitter for 
normal ICMPv6 and that with our proposed IPS for 
ICMPv6. Figure 7 illustrates that the proposed IPS reduces 
the Jitter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Integrating IPv6 with Smart Grid is quite natural, as only 
IPv6 could match the size of Smart Grid network. The large 
address space, auto configuration of addresses, QoS support 
technology helps Smart grid to construct a large network 
with a unique address specified for each and every device, 
efficient routing, end-to-end security. However, smart grid 
has very high security demand that needs to be considered 
before deploying IPv6 towards building Smart Grid. In this 
paper, the problems of using ICMPv6 in NDP and the 
possible effects of these problems on Smart Grid are 
considered. Three main functions of NDP: Router 
Discovery, Duplicate Address Detection and Neighbor 
Discovery are discussed with respect to Smart Grid 
environment. We first consider the normal procedure for 
executing each phase, and then discuss the possible attacks. 
Finally a prevention procedure is given to secure the system. 
The proposed work considers multiple security breaches on 
Smart Grid and provides an IPS to prevent these attacks in 
Router Discovery and Updation phase as well as in Neighbor 
Discovery and DAD phase. This, in turn, helps preventing 
several attacks on ICMPv6 protocol, like DoS, man-in-the-
middle attack, spoofing attacks efficiently. It is also light 
weight and does not burden the system with unnecessary 
packet overhead.  
A possible bootstrap problem of the proposed IPS system 
Fig. 5: False Negative vs. Number of Malicious DCUs  
 
Fig. 6: False Negative vs. Node Density 
Fig 7: Jitter Vs Node Density for ICMPv6 and Modified ICMPv6 
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has been considered and found insignificant in section III.A.
The proposed methodology builds the foundation for several
meaningful extensions in future.  In future, we want to ex-
tend this work to detect collaborative attacks on smart grid.
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